Abstract: Economics has devoted little attention so far as to whether the type of decision maker matters for economic decisions. However, many important decisions like those on monetary policy or a company's business strategy are made by (small) groups rather than an individual. We compare behavior of individuals and small groups in an experimental beauty-contest game. Our findings suggest that groups do not apply deeper levels of reasoning per se, but that they learn faster than individuals. When individuals compete against groups, the latter significantly outperform the former in terms of payoff.
I.

Introduction
In economics a 'decision maker' is usually modeled as an individual. However, in many real-life situations the decision makers are, in fact, groups rather than individuals, such as families, boards of directors, legislatures or committees. Households and firms, the main decision making agents in economic theory, are typically not individuals, but groups of people with a joint stake in economic decisions. Similarly, political or military decisions as well as decisions on monetary policy, for instance, are taken by groups rather than individuals.
Traditional economic theory is silent on the influence of the decision maker on actual decisions. Needless to say that public choice theory deals with group decisionmaking, but the focus is on the aggregation of individual preferences and the rules of decision making within groups. It therefore widely neglects behavioral differences between individuals and groups, which are at the heart of social psychology, but also relevant for economics, given the importance of group decisions.
One straightforward explanation for the theoretic irrelevance of the decision maker in economics is the structure of many models. For instance, if a Nash equilibrium or a maximizing choice exists, economic theory predicts the optimal strategy to be chosen, irrespective of which type of decision maker is acting. If, however, decision making agents do not act according to equilibrium predictions, behavioral explanations for economic decisions gain importance. Thus, a growing literature has concentrated on the impact of different characteristics of the decision maker, among which the differences between male and female decision makers are most thoroughly studied (see Eckel and Grossman, 1998 , or Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001 . Only very recently, the relevance of whether the decision maker is an individual or a small group has caught considerable attention.
In this paper, we use an experimental beauty-contest game to examine whether the decision maker matters for actual decisions. In particular, we address the following research questions: (1) Do groups apply deeper levels of reasoning in the sense that they guess systematically lower numbers, which are closer to the equilibrium of the game, and are groups learning faster when the game is repeated? (2) Do groups outperform individuals in terms of payoffs when groups compete against individuals in a beautycontest game?
Our first research question is related to a growing body of economic literature examining whether groups behave and decide differently than individuals. In recent years, several authors have investigated possible differences between individual and group decisions. Almost all of these studies use the toolbox of experimental economics to study the behavior of individuals and groups under controlled laboratory conditions, which differ only with respect to the 'decision maker'. An interesting general facet of these studies is the fact that differences in decision making between groups and individuals can neither be explained by simple aggregation of individual preferences or choices nor by simple theories of group decision making. . However, if the responder rejects the offer, both get nothing.
Bornstein and Yaniv compare two treatments, one with individuals playing against individuals and one with groups (of three subjects each) playing against groups. Their − main result is that groups are more (game-theoretically) rational players than individuals by demanding more than individuals in the role of proposer and accepting relatively lower offers in the role of responder. Cox (2001) has examined individual and group decisions in an investment game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995) , where a trustor can send an amount c x ≤ x 3 to a trustee. The amount x is tripled, and the trustee can send back any amount y ≤ . Cox and Hayne (1998) have explored decision making of groups and individuals in common value auctions, characterized by risky outcomes. Though both groups and individuals deviate from rational bidding when they have more information, groups are more affected by the 'disadvantage' of information, leading to the conclusion that groups are less rational decision makers than individuals. The studies of Bone, Hey and Suckling (1999) and Rockenbach, Sadrieh and Mathauschek (2001) are somewhat related to the paper by Cox and Hayne in that they investigate group decision making under risk. Both papers cannot provide evidence that group decisions significantly comply better with expected utility theory. However, Rockenbach et al. also find that groups take the better risks, meaning that they accumulate significantly more expected value at a significantly lower total risk.
Finally, a recent paper by Blinder and Morgan (2000) studies group versus individual decision making in an urn problem and in a monetary policy experiment.
Blinder and Morgan are particularly interested in whether groups are slower in decision making than individuals. Measuring the speed of decision-making by the amount of information needed before reaching a decision, they find no support for the widely held belief that groups are slower. Furthermore, group decisions are on average superior to individual decisions by about 4% in terms of payoff. Note, however, that Blinder and Morgan use a within-subjects design. Subjects act subsequently both as individuals and as members of a group (of five persons each). There is no independent comparison of individual and group decision-making and there is no interaction between decision making units.
When examining differences of learning between individuals and groups, we enter largely unexplored territory in economics. To be more specific, differences in learning, sophistication and strategic teaching seem to be a promising avenue to explain why group decisions cannot adequately be accounted for by simple aggregation of individual choices. By repeating the beauty-contest game we are able to analyze learning of individuals and groups comparatively.
Our second research question concentrates on the effects of the type of decision maker in a direct interaction between individuals and groups. To the best of our knowledge, this question has not been addressed so far in the economic literature on individual and group decision-making. However, we think it is important to analyze whether groups can outperform individuals or vice versa in direct interaction. On financial markets, for instance, there are always both types of investors, single individuals and investor groups.
2 Given the resemblance between structures on financial 2 It seems no coincidence that, as far as we know, the only empirical paper with field data on the different performance of groups and individuals is on mutual fund management. Prather and Middleton (2002) find that there is no appreciable difference between the outcomes of team-managed and individually-managed funds. Note, however, that their study had considerable difficulties in distinguishing between team-and individually-managed funds.
markets and in the beauty-contest game, to find one type of decision maker outperforming the other would have important implications for financial decision making.
Note that the beauty-contest provides an excellent framework for our research questions, because, contrary to most of the previous studies on groups and individuals, fairness or distribution arguments are not relevant in the beauty-contest game and loss or risk aversion cannot occur. Furthermore, compared to the experiments of Bone et al.
or Rockenbach et al., the beauty-contest game is not concerned with meeting or deviating from the axioms of expected utility theory. These characteristics of the beauty-contest game constitute, in our mind, a very favorable environment for analyzing reasoning and learning of decision makers, in particular whether groups apply deeper levels of reasoning and whether groups outperform individuals in a direct interaction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the beauty-contest game. Our hypotheses on individual versus group behavior are deducted in Section III. Section IV reports on a first experimental series where individuals compete against individuals, and groups compete against groups in order to compare reasoning and the iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the beauty-contest game. Section V analyzes the data of Section IV with respect to learning theories in the repeated beauty-contest game and examines the learning characteristics of the two types of decision makers. Motivated by the results of Sections IV and V, we have run a second experimental series where individuals directly compete against groups. The results are presented in Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
II. The Beauty-Contest Game
In a beauty-contest game -which was already likened to professional investment activity by Keynes (1936) -N decision makers, be it individuals or groups, simultaneously choose a real number from the closed interval I ≡ [0,100]. The mean of all choices for round t is denoted t x . The winner is the decision maker whose number is closest to a number , being defined as * x t x p ⋅ , where p ∈ (0,1) is fixed for all rounds and announced at the beginning of the game. This game is dominance solvable. The process of iterated elimination of dominated strategies leads to the game's unique equilibrium at which all players choose zero.
3 The game-theoretic structure makes the beauty-contest game an ideal tool to study how many iterations of eliminating dominated strategies a decision maker actually applies (Camerer, 1997) . Textbook rationality would require the decision maker to iterate infinitely.
Previous studies (see Nagel, 1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt, 1998; Güth, Kocher and Sutter, 2002) found that decision makers iterate only a limited number of steps. Surveys of experimental results of beauty-contest games by Camerer (1997), Nagel (1999) or Bosch-Domenech et al. (2000) show that behavior is characterized by very similar patterns across very different subject pools and (session) sample sizes. First round guessing averages are typically in the 20s and 30s, and decline 3 Rational players will exclude the interval [100p,100] because any number in this interval is dominated by 100p. If a rational player believes all others to be rational as well (by also excluding the interval [100p,100]), she will exclude [100p²,100], and so on. Choosing zero remains the only nonexcluded strategy, given common knowledge of rationality.
in the course of repetition towards the game theoretic equilibrium, without reaching it.
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Choosing the game-theoretic equilibrium is rare and would never have led to winning the game.
Interestingly, the beauty-contest game, although extensively studied, has been performed exclusively with individuals as decision makers. By extending the experimental setting to a group against group and a group against individuals treatment, where groups consist of three subjects each, we are able to explore whether the 'decision maker' matters in an interactive situation, where reasoning processes and learning of different types of decision makers (individuals or groups) can be compared, without having other motives involved like fairness, risk or loss aversion.
III. Individual versus group behavior
A. Individual versus group reasoning
The widely held belief that groups reach more rational or 'better' decisions than individuals is far from being confirmed by psychological literature. In the idealized form of the group superiority argument groups are, e.g., considered to balance biases, catch errors and stimulate thoughtful work (Davis, 1992) . Since the 1950s the conventional wisdom of group superiority has been challenged by numerous experiments (among other classics, see Lorge and Solomon, 1955; Asch, 1956 ), leading to the conclusion that group discussion "can attenuate, amplify, or simply reproduce the judgmental bias of individuals" (Kerr, McCoun and Kramer, 1996, p. 693) . There are 4 The number of decision makers, N, has an influence on the speed of convergence (see Ho et al., 1998) . The larger N, the more rapid is the convergence towards the equilibrium. Note however that N=2 is an exception, because the lower number always wins if p<1 (see Grosskopf and Nagel, 2001) .
two prominent approaches to explain why groups might actually fail to make better decisions than individuals.
First, group conformity and self-censorship may lead to so-called 'groupthink', which may result in symptoms like stereotyping outside people, putting pressure on inside people who disagree, closed-mindedness or incomplete survey of available options and failure to assess the risks of preferred options (Sniezek, 1992; Kleindorfer, Kunreuther and Schoemaker, 1993; Mullen, Salas and Driskell, 1994) . Especially groups with designated leaders are prone to groupthink's adverse effects, resulting in inefficient decision-making.
Second, groups tend to polarize individual attitudinal judgment in many circumstances, which is also known under the label 'risky shift' (Stoner, 1968) . This effect, which is contrasting the intuitive conjecture that groups tend to moderate extreme positions, has been proved in many different settings (Davis, 1992; Kerr et al., 1996) and is sometimes referred to as the 'group polarization hypothesis ' (Cason and Mui, 1997) . But note that there is also considerable evidence that groups may shift individual attitudes towards moderate positions (Moscovici, 1985) .
Hence, the psychological literature fails to detect any general difference in decision making between individuals and groups. However, distinguishing between distinct types of decision tasks can reveal some specific differences between individuals and groups.
Basically, one can distinguish between intellective tasks and judgmental tasks, where for the former there is a clear ex-post evaluation criterion for the quality of performance and the latter lack such a criterion. Intellective tasks can be further differentiated with respect to their 'demonstrability', i.e., to which degree the knowledge of the solution to the task is shared by group members once it is voiced.
Typically, groups perform better than individuals on (non-interactive) intellective tasks (which are often tasks against nature), meaning that groups more often guess correctly than individuals, or groups are, on average, closer to the correct solution than individuals are (Hastie, 1986; Levine and Moreland, 1998) . This is particularly the case for decision tasks which are highly demonstrable, because in such situations "truth wins", i.e. the group is most likely to adopt a correct solution advocated by a single group member. On judgmental tasks, there seems to be no systematic difference between individuals and groups.
The beauty-contest game exhibits characteristics of both an intellective task and a judgmental task. The judgmental aspect arises from the interactive structure of the beauty-contest game. Expectations on other decision makers' guesses are crucial for one's own guess. The intellective task consists in the iterated elimination of dominated strategies and the correct adaptation of one's own guess to one's expectations of others'
guesses. The intellective part of the beauty-contest game can be considered as demonstrable, since the rationale of the game and the dynamics of guesses -given that the parameter p < 1 -can be explained relatively easily.
Provided that groups are better in solving intellective tasks and taking into account that groups are neither systematically superior nor inferior to individuals with respect to judgmental tasks, we arrive at the following predictions:
1)
Groups apply deeper levels of reasoning than individuals and group guesses are closer to the game-theoretic equilibrium.
2) If groups compete directly against individuals in a beauty-contest game, groups should win the contest more often than individuals.
B. Individual versus group learning
The beauty-contest game is repeated in our experiments in order to obtain some evidence on learning of individuals and groups. Due to the fact that previous experimental studies in economics have heavily relied on individuals as decision makers, it is a hitherto unresolved issue whether there are differences in learning between individuals and groups.
According to information load theory, based on the work by Chalos and Pickard (1985) , groups have higher decision consistency and are able to process high information load better than individuals in intellective tasks. 5 When repeating a beautycontest game, decision makers have to process the information from the previous rounds (guessing distribution, mean, winning number etc.) in order to form expectations about guesses in the current round. Information load theory would predict that groups are better in processing this information than individuals. Hence, groups should realize the strategic nature of the game faster, and the process of convergence towards the equilibrium should also be faster compared to individuals.
IV. Experiment I: Competition among Homogeneous Decision Makers
A. Experimental Design
In our first series of experiments individuals compete against individuals, and groups (of three subjects each) against groups. The parameter p was set to p = 2/3.
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The experiment was run as a classroom experiment. There were two parallel sessions on May 11 th (with 17 individuals and 17 groups, respectively) and on June 6 th 5 See also Hill (1982, pp. 520-2) for a survey of group versus individual performance in learning tasks.
6 Nagel (1995) has shown that players are systematically influenced by the parameter p of the game.
Since we are interested in differences between individuals and groups, but not in the influence of p, we restrict ourselves to the single parameter p = 2/3.
2000 (with 18 decision makers in each treatment) 7 . In total, 140 first-year-students from undergraduate economics courses participated in this series of experiments, providing us with 35 observations per treatment and round. 8 Participants had not been confronted with game theory in any class before participating in the experiment. Assignment to an experimental treatment (individual or group) and to a specific group in the group treatment was random.
The winner of each round in the individual treatment was paid 140 Austrian Schillings (about 10.5 Euro or 10 US$), whereas winning groups were paid three times the individual amount (420 Austrian Schillings). Hence, we kept the per-subject monetary incentives constant across the individual and group treatments. In case of a tie, the amount was split equally between individuals, respectively groups. Winners were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment, all others received nothing.
Sessions lasted at most 40 minutes and were conducted as follows. Subjects got written instructions 9 , which were read aloud, offering subjects the opportunity to ask private questions. Sessions consisted of four rounds. In each round subjects wrote their guesses on a separate response card. These cards were collected after each round and numbers were read aloud and written on an overhead projector without identifying individuals or groups. Then we calculated and announced the total sum, the average, two-thirds of the average, and the winning number. Once this information had been revealed, the next round was started.
7 Like in Nagel (1995), we have chosen a relatively large number of decision makers, because convergence of behavior towards the game-theoretic equilibrium is faster in relatively large sessions, since single players have less influence on the outcome. Therefore, if we will observe systematic differences between groups and individuals in a relatively large session, where convergence has been shown to be rather quick and stable, we can exclude differences to arise from comparatively erratic behavior in very small sessions (see Ho et al., 1998 , who had a session size of three and seven, respectively).
Subjects in the individual treatment were isolated from one another and were not allowed to communicate with each other. They were given up to five minutes time per round to decide on their number.
Groups in the group treatment gathered in the large Aula of the faculty. Each group sat at a separate table. The minimum distance to the next group (table) was about 5 meters. Groups had five minutes time 10 to discuss face-to-face and agree on a single number to be written down on the 'group card' for a given round. 11 Group members were requested not to speak with a loud voice and were strictly forbidden to speak to members of other groups.
B. Experimental Results
B1. First Round Behavior
The mean and median of first round chosen numbers are 34.9 and 32, respectively, for individuals as well as 30.8 and 29.05 for groups. As in previous studies of the beauty-contest game, first-round choices are generally far away from equilibrium, irrespective of the decision maker. Numbers below 10 are quite infrequent (6% of groups and 12% of individuals). Dominated choices (those larger than 100 ) rarely occur; we have only one observation for groups (3%) and four observations for individuals (11%). Contrary to most previous studies we have a considerable number of non-integer numbers already in the first round, namely 11 and 14 for individuals and groups, respectively. p ⋅ 9 A translation of the one-page instructions, originally in German, is provided in Appendix A. 10 The time limit was not strictly enforced in either of the treatments. Discussions in groups were finished in less than five minutes in most cases in round 1 and in all cases in subsequent rounds.
11 Group cards with more than one number on it would have been invalid. Yet, there was no such case.
INSERT FIGURE 1. CUMULATIVE FREQUENCIES OF GUESSES
The cumulative frequencies of guesses in round 1 are plotted in panel A of Figure   1 . Individual guesses are more evenly spread than those of groups. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that both samples are drawn from the same population.
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Given this evidence, we have to reject our hypothesis that groups guess significantly smaller numbers than individuals, at least for the first round. Groups do not reason deeper than individuals with regard to the iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
We can also reject our intuitive notion that groups expect other groups to reason deeper than individuals expect other individuals to do, because in that case group averages would have to be significantly below individual averages.
One reason for the apparent lack of difference between groups and individuals could be the fact that in the first round neither decision maker has any information on behavior in this sort of game. That means that the group advantage in information processing -as claimed in the information load theory -cannot arise in the first round.
Furthermore, there is some evidence (Mennecke and Valacich, 1998) that groups, which are put together ad hoc, as is the case in our experiments, need some time to coordinate their activities and to share their understanding of the game. Five minutes of discussion might have been too short to substantiate into significantly lower guesses of groups. This latter idea is corroborated by the explanations of choices, which we asked subjects to write down on a sheet of paper after the decisions. Reasoning and elaboration of choice do not seem to be very much different between individuals and groups in the first round according to these explanations. The next subsection will examine in detail whether groups apply deeper levels of reasoning than individuals when the game is repeated.
B2. Behavior in Rounds 2, 3, and 4
In Figures 2 and 3 we plot the transitions from round t to round t for t = 1, 2, and 3. Observations below the diagonal indicate that the chosen number in round t is smaller than the number in round t. As can be seen, chosen numbers decline significantly over time in both the individual and the group treatment ( and for each transition in the individual and group treatment, respectively;
Wilcoxon signed-ranks test). Only 18, respectively 11, out of 105 observations lie above the diagonal in the two treatments.
Note that 11 out of 35 individuals, but only 1 out of 35 groups, choose a higher number in round 2 than in round 1. Individual and group behavior is significantly different in this respect (χ² = 10.05; df = 1; p < 0.01). This is a clear indication that groups understand the intellective task-aspect of the beauty-contest game significantly faster than individuals do.
Comparing both decision makers with respect to chosen numbers in rounds 2 to 4 we find that groups choose systematically lower numbers ( 001 0. p < in any round;
Mann-Whitney U-test). This is also immediately clear from looking at panels B, C and D in Figure 1 , where cumulative frequencies of group guesses are systematically to the left of individual guesses. Given the fact that there was no statistical difference in chosen numbers in the first round, the results seem to be an indication for group learning to be faster than individual learning (see also Section V).
However, the mean as well as the median of chosen numbers were already slightly lower for groups than for individuals in the first round. Therefore, the reason for systematic differences in chosen numbers in rounds 2 to 4 might be due to the lower reference point (mean of round 1) in the group treatment. To check for that possibility, we re-calculated chosen numbers in rounds 2 to 4 as a fraction of the corresponding previous round's mean and tested whether fractions were different between individuals and groups. Actually, groups choose systematically lower fractions ( in any round; Mann-Whitney U-test), corroborating our hypothesis that groups converge much faster towards the equilibrium level than individuals do.
The same pattern can be detected in the percentage changes of median guesses from round to round, which are included in Table 1 . Percentage changes of medians are considerably larger for groups than for individuals until round 3. From round 3 to round 4 there seems to be no difference in the percentage changes of the median guess between individuals and groups. However, this is mainly due to the fact that the medians in both group sessions were already very low in round 3 (2.63 in session 1, and 3.74 in session 2, respectively, but 9.71 and 15.74 for individuals). As we have seen so far, subjects do not choose the equilibrium solution of the game, neither in the first round nor in any of the repetitions. It has already been shown by Nagel (1995) , Stahl (1996) , Duffy and Nagel (1997) and Ho et al. (1998) . For t = 0, we set , which has been shown to be a reasonable assumption in this type of beauty-contest (see Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Ho et al., 1998) . as modal values, which was also the case in Nagel (1995) . This is in marked contrast to groups, for which we have
(round 4) and even (round 3)
as modal values. A Mann-Whitney U-test confirms the impression arising from Table 2 that groups apply deeper levels of reasoning (higher d's) than individuals for rounds 2 to 4 ( in any round). Note that the difference is not significant in the first round ( ). Previous experiments with individuals as decision makers have not found any significant evidence that subjects employ increasing depths of reasoning within the first three or four rounds of a beauty-contest games (Nagel, 1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997) .
We can provide clear evidence that groups apply increasing depths of reasoning in the transitions from round 1 to round 2 ( 01 0. p < , sign test on whether group i's depth of reasoning increased, decreased or remained unchanged from round t to round t ) and 1 + from round 2 to round 3 ( , sign test). There is no further increase in depth of reasoning between rounds 3 and 4. For individuals we find no statistically significant increase in depth of reasoning until round 3, but in the transition from round 3 to round 4 we observe an increase ( , sign test). -Domenech et al. (2000) provide evidence that once subjects reach the second, or third reasoning level, they often jump all the (infinite) steps towards the Nash equilibrium: one, two, (three), infinity. In our sessions we never had any individual or group choosing zero.
13 This is a quite reasonable behavior since zero could pay off only in case all other competitors would choose the Nash equilibrium as well. In other words, the Nash solution is not trembling-hand perfect. What is usually taken for rational behavior (choosing Nash) represents, in fact, a rational ignorance of other players' bounded rationality. 14 In our experiments, groups -as well as individuals -correctly anticipate that other participants do not go all the way to infinite reasoning. However, groups proceed systematically further to the theoretical rationality threshold than individuals immediately after the first round of experience with the game.
Comparing patterns of learning of individual with the ones of groups leads to the conclusion that groups learn faster and adapt faster to a newly introduced task than individuals do. One explanation for this could be the possibility of discussing the structure and the dynamics of the beauty-contest game within groups. Yet, our result that even individuals increase their depths of reasoning in the final round might be an indication that more experience with the game can serve as a substitute for group discussion and groups' higher capacity in information processing. Summarizing the 13 In Nagel (1995) only three subjects choose zero in the fourth round in treatment p = 0.5 and none in p = 2/3. Therefore, our results are very similar to hers in this respect.
evidence from rounds 2 to 4, we can, therefore, confirm our hypothesis that groups learn faster than individuals in the context of the beauty-contest game.
There are however several other possible explanations which deserve attention.
Groups may choose lower numbers from the second round on, because they expect other groups to reason deeper compared to the expectations that individuals build on other individuals. After having understood the basic dynamics of the game or the step reasoning underlying the unraveling process, i.e. before choosing a number in round 2, groups might take into account that other groups are also able to grasp the meaning of the dynamics -according to the information load theory. Hence, they decide to choose lower numbers than they would if they interacted with individuals.
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In line with this reasoning, Bornstein et al. (2002) provide evidence that different types of decision makers react differently to the type of decision maker they are interacting with. They find in a trust game that individual behavior is independent of the other side being an individual or a group of subjects. Contrary to that, group behavior is strikingly contingent on the type of decision maker a group is paired with. Behavior is much more rational and less other-regarding, if a group is paired with a group than if a group is paired with an individual. Judging from the experimental questionnaires, Bornstein et al. find that groups expect other groups to be more rational and, consequently, less generous than individuals. Individuals report no differences in expected behavior of groups or individuals.
Camerer, Ho and Chong's (2000, 2001) notion of sophistication in repeated games
provides another explanation for the group results in our beauty-contest experiment.
Sophisticated players know others are learning, so in the beauty contest game they 'jump ahead' by iterating more steps of reasoning and choose lower numbers than a best response model would predict. One might, for instance, assume that the proportion of sophisticated players in a population is q and that they are independently drawn and assigned to the individual and group treatment. Then in any one group of three persons the chance of having at least one sophisticated player is 1-(1-q)³, which is larger than q for any q > 0. Given that 'truth wins', i.e. if there is one sophisticated person then the group as a whole acts sophisticatedly, then it is reasonable to expect groups to choose lower numbers than individuals do. Of course, a priori there is no 'true' number in the beauty contest game, but sophisticated group members might prevent groups from choosing dominated numbers or might track the development of means in subsequent rounds in order to derive a projection of what is going to happen in the next round. In any case, if we have a proportion of players that is sophisticated and we assume that 'truth wins' within groups (which seems a reasonable benchmark), the probability of sophisticated play of groups is, of course, higher than the one of individuals.
V. Econometric Estimations of Learning in the Beauty-Contest Game
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Previous studies have already applied learning theories to account for the dynamics of (individuals') decision-making behavior when a beauty-contest game is repeated.
Nagel (1995) finds support for a simple 'directional' learning model, which is based on Selten and Stoecker (1986) . Learning direction theory predicts that subjects change unsuccessful behavior in the direction of behavior which would have been successful in 15 Section VI presents results regarding the direct interaction of groups with individuals. 16 We owe the estimations in this section to Colin Camerer, Teck-Hua Ho and Xin Wang. Camerer, Ho and Chong (2001) report the hit rates and log likelihood of different learning models for our data on which our Section IV is based (see our Appendix B). the past. Using Nagel's (1995) data, Stahl (1996) reports that a combination of reinforcement and directional learning produces the best fit to Nagel's data.
Reinforcement learning (see Roth and Erev, 1995) captures the basic insights from psychology that choices leading to good outcomes in the past are more frequently repeated in the future (law of effect; Thorndike, 1898) 
Note that the experience weight is updated according to 1
and the logit response function (2) with λ as response sensitivity maps attractions into probabilities:
The most important part from an empirical point of view are, of course, the parameters δ, φ and κ. Their economic meaning is explained below. Note that the difference between EWA and fEWA is that those three parameters are replaced in fEWA by deterministic functions of player i's experience up to round t. 17 Due to a specific restriction of the fEWA model (φ=δ), fEWA fits beauty-contest data worse than the EWA model, where δ can be close to one (which means that foregone payoffs receive (almost) the same weight as actual payoffs for reinforcing choice probabilities). 
, where k is the number of parameters, N of subjects and T of periods.
e Underscored are fixed parameters. Table 3 reports total log likelihood (in and out-of-sample) and hit rates for different learning models (as specified in Ho et al., 2001 ). In-sample estimates are calibrated on 70% of the subjects. The rest of the observations is used to test for out-of-sample validation, which gives an important clue of the predictability of the model. In the first three rows of panel A in Table 3 we apply the different learning models to all data from Section IV, irrespective of the type of decision maker. As can be seen, the EWA model and the belief-based model fit best with respect to log likelihood. Then, we separate the overall data by the type of decision maker, showing again best fit with EWA and a belief-based model. Table 3 gives the parameter estimates of the EWA and belief-based models for groups and individuals separately. 18 The parameter φ reflects the decay of previous attractions (i.e., the probability of choosing a certain strategy) due to forgetting or deliberate ignorance of old experience in case the learning environment is changing and subjects know that. A lower φ puts a higher decay on old experience. The parameter κ controls for the growth rate of attractions. A low κ, as is typical for beauty-contest games, implies that attractions are weighted averages of lagged attractions and payoffs.
Panel B of
The weight on foregone payoffs is captured by δ. A δ = 0 would mean that foregone payoffs play no role at all, whereas δ = 1 would imply that foregone payoffs have the same weight as actual payoffs. Finally, λ is the response sensitivity for mapping attractions into choice probabilities.
There are two noteworthy differences between groups and individuals. Groups have a lower φ, meaning that groups adapt faster to a changing environment, i.e. to the dynamics of chosen numbers and averages.
19 Furthermore, when considering the EWA model, which is the more general learning model than the belief-based model, the δ-estimate for groups equals one, meaning that they weigh foregone payoffs (which would have resulted from other strategies) exactly like actual payoffs when updating choice probabilities. Individuals, however, have a δ-estimate smaller than one, implying that individuals weigh foregone payoffs less than actual payoffs and, hence, process less information when updating choice probabilities, which hinders convergence to equilibrium in a winner-takes-all beauty-contest game.
VI. Experiment II: Competition among Heterogeneous Decision Makers
Even though groups learn faster the characteristics of the game, and, therefore, converge faster to the equilibrium than individuals do, we cannot conclude from our first series of experiments with interaction between the same type of decision maker(s) whether one type of decision maker outperforms the other with respect to payoffs. In order to assess the comparative performance of different types of decision makers we have run a second series of beauty-contest experiments, where groups compete directly against individuals.
A. Experimental Design
The second experimental series has been conducted on January 15 th , 2001 at the University of Innsbruck. Like in the first series participants were first-year students of contest. They find that experienced players are more likely to be sophisticated, i.e., to anticipate how others learn, and, hence, they have higher decay rates of previous attractions.
undergraduate economics courses, and groups always consisted of three subjects each.
Contrary to the first series, we had less decision makers per unit of observation in order to get more data on performance and payoffs. We ran three sessions with 20 participants each, of which two individuals and one group (with three subjects) composed one independent unit of observation. Thus, we gathered a total of 12 independent observations, with 24 individuals and 12 groups.
Subjects got written instructions, which were read aloud. Questions were answered privately. After that, there was a random assignment to the type of decision maker. The experiment was fully computerized with the help of z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) . After the assignment procedure, individuals and groups were separated. Groups were led to separate rooms, equipped with a computer, where they could discuss their decision in private. Individuals remained in the lab. None of the decision makers could figure out with which group, respectively individual(s) it was paired.
The beauty-contest game was played for four rounds. In each round, a winning individual (group) received 80 (240) Austrian Schillings. 20 After having made their decisions, and before they were informed about the choices of the other decision makers in their unit, decision makers were asked to shortly explain the reasons for their decision and their reasoning process on a sheet of paper. Then, decision makers were informed of the numbers chosen by the two individuals and by the group 21 , the average of all chosen numbers, two-thirds of the average, and the winning number. After that, the next round was started. 20 In case of a tie, the amount was split equally between winning decision makers (with identical payoffs for each subject involved). Winners were paid privately in cash at the end of the experiment, all others received nothing. 21 We indicated whether a number originated from a group or from an individual (either individual 1, or individual 2).
B. Experimental Results
Given the relatively obvious picture of our first series of experiments, we had clear expectations with regard to the results of this mixed treatment with heterogeneous decision makers. Nevertheless, we were, though, somehow astonished that practically all of our prior findings could be confirmed. Table 4 summarizes average chosen numbers and the number of winners of each type of decision maker. 22 Note, first, that groups choose on average higher numbers than individuals in the first round, which is another indication that groups are not better decision makers per se. 23 In rounds 2 to 4, groups choose on average lower numbers than individuals. However, averaging over all independent observations, chosen numbers are not significantly different between groups and individuals in any of the four rounds. Since we have 12 independent units of observation, the insignificance with respect to chosen numbers might be caused by different time paths of chosen numbers in single units. Indeed, if we check for the order of chosen numbers within independent units (of two individuals and one group each), we find the following: Groups choose significantly more often the minimum number within a unit (26 times in all four rounds, individuals only 22 times; p < 0.01, binomial test with 2/3 probability for individuals), whereas individuals choose significantly more often the maximum number (40 times versus 8 times for groups; p < 0.05, binomial test). Interestingly, there is no difference in the first round, which resembles our results from the first experimental series with homogeneous decision makers and all our 22 The raw data are included in Appendix C. Like in Ho et al. (1998) , guesses in small groups of only three decision makers are rather erratic sometimes. 23 Analyzing the reasons for choosing a certain number, it becomes obvious that there is no apparent difference between the reasoning processes of individuals and groups in the first round of the game. Both types of decision makers state quite frequently that they had no idea of what would happen, and, thus, had just picked some number. About the same number of individuals and groups (two or three) had indicated that a reasonable average in the first round would be 50. Therefore, they had chosen a number around 33
(two thirds of the expected average).
explanations from above apply again. In the first round the existing information may be either too scarce or groups may not be able to process the existing information properly, possibly because group cohesion has not been established yet or the group decision process is still evolving and not yet functioning smoothly. Judging from the written explanations for their decisions and from the number of dominated choices (which was higher for groups than for individuals), it seems very unlikely that groups expected individuals to choose relatively higher numbers, such that groups' choices in the first round could have been rationalized. Looking at winners, we find 9 individuals and 3 groups winning in the first round.
If winning was randomly distributed among decision makers, we would have expected 8 individuals, respectively 4 groups to win. Yet, in the second round we observe just the reverse. We have 8 (out of 12) winning groups, but only 4 (out of 24) winning individuals. Applying a binomial test (with 2/3 probability for individuals), groups win significantly more often than individuals (p < 0.05). In rounds 3 and 4, groups win more often than expected, but not significantly so in any of these rounds, and individuals increase the frequency of winning. This indicates that individuals are able to catch up a bit in rounds 3 and 4. This finding is in line with results in Section IV, where we have found individuals to increase the depths of reasoning from round 3 to 4. The crucial advantage of groups stems from their more successful choices in round 2, indicating again that groups are able to adapt much faster to the environment of the beauty-contest game and to discuss and process the information available after round 1.
24
One way to look at the differences in information processing of individuals and groups is to relate a decision maker's number to the mean of the previous round. For that purpose, we take the average of the two numbers of the individuals within a unit and the number of the group and relate these figures to the previous round's mean. This yields 12 independent observations for each decision maker for any transition from round t to t + 1 (for t = 1, 2, 3). In the transitions from round 1 to 2, and from round 2 to 3, groups choose a significantly lower fraction of the previous round's mean than individuals do (p < 0.05 for both transitions, two-sided U-test). However, choosing ever-lower numbers need not be a successful strategy. In 18 out of 48 winning cases, the median number was the winning number. In the other 30 cases, the minimum number was the winning one. 25 Interestingly, winning groups and winning individuals differ with respect to the order of the winning number (χ² = 2.71, df = 1, p = 0.1). Group wins are based 17 times on the minimum number, but only 5 times on the median number.
Individual wins are achieved with the minimum, respectively median number in the unit, 13 times each. In 9 out of 13 cases where individuals won with the median number, groups had chosen the minimum number.
24 Note that groups even have the opportunity to simulate the game within the group to grasp a better understanding of the dynamics of the game. 25 Note that in a beauty-contest game with p<1 the maximum number can never be the winning number, unless all submitted numbers are equal. See Grosskopf and Nagel (2001) 
VII. Conclusion
This paper has addressed whether the type of 'decision maker' has any influence on actual decisions. Even though the psychological literature has dealt with this topic for quite a long time, the main focus of psychological research has typically been put on Given our evidence, it is not a surprise that many important and recurrent decisions are entrusted to groups, not only in economics. In an ever more complicated world, it may be beneficial to use groups as decision makers instead of individuals. However, we still know too little, for instance with respect to which tasks should actually be entrusted to small groups as decision makers or which internal structure of small groups contributes best to reach 'optimal decisions' and prevents adverse effects like groupthink or an overconfidence bias. It is not very difficult to detect differences between individual and group decisions. Ultimately, research on the differences between individual and group behavior should, however, result in an improved economic theory of decision-making, which accounts for the difference between different types of decision makers and is similarly precise as the standard economic theory. This paper is able to provide some pieces of evidence that may help to learn more about the role of the type of decision maker, but much more evidence is required.
Future research should, thus, address the following questions in order to gain more insights into the advantages and disadvantages of group decision making: (1) How do groups make their decisions? Blinder and Morgan (2000) discuss three simple, intuitive models of group decision making. None of them ("the whole is equal to the sum of its parts"; "the median voter theory"; "may the best man (or woman) win") gets them very far. Even though public choice theory has taught us a lot on group decision-making, it cannot resolve the question of differences between group and individual decisionmaking and it has barely addressed the question of how decisions are actually taken within groups, so far. (2) Which is the optimal group size? The quality of group decisions in committees, executive boards etc. might depend on the size of a group.
Certainly, an increasing group size not only increases human capital, but also transaction costs for reaching decisions and the mere costs of decision making since more heads are more expensive. Research on public good provision has not found a significant effect of group size on the provision of public goods (see Isaac and Walker, 1994) , but that might have been caused by the fact that group members had to make an individual decision whether to contribute or not. Therefore, it would be interesting to see whether group size has a significant influence in unitary groups, where group members have to agree on a single joint decision. Each group (consisting of three persons) has to write down a number x i in the interval [0,100] on its response card, which contains an anonymous group code. Zero and one hundred are also possible choices.
The number need not be integer.
The winning group is the one whose number is closest to x , defined as: After all groups have written down their number, response cards will be collected. Chosen numbers will be announced and written down on a transparency sheet, without revealing group codes. Then we will calculate the total sum, the average, two-thirds of the average (= x ), and we will encircle the winning number.
There will be four rounds, so that each group has to make four separate decisions on x i . After each round you will be informed about the decisions of all other groups and the winning number, before the next round starts.
In each round, a group has a maximum of 5 minutes time to discuss and agree on a single number x i . If there is more than one number on a response card, the card is invalid. We would be grateful if you could write down your motives for choosing a certain x i on the explanation sheet at your table.
In discussions, please, speak with as low a voice as possible! You are not allowed to speak to members of other groups! If you have any further questions, please raise your hand and the instructor will come to you. Note: I1, I2, and G stand for individual 1, individual 2, respectively the group in a given unit of observation. 
APPENDIX B
Raw Data for treatments with homogeneous decision makers
